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Lockey: The Florida Intrigues of Jose Alvarez de Toledo

THE

FLORIDA INTRIGUES
OF
1
ALVAREZ DE TOLEDO
By J OSEPH B. L OCKEY

JOSE

Jose Alvarez de Toledo came to the United States
in September, 1811, in the character of a political
refugee. He gave it to be understood that he had
been compelled to flee from Spain because of his
sympathies with the revolutionary movement then
beginning to make itself felt throughout Spanish
America. He resided at Philadelphia until the end
of 1812, and then proceeded to the southwestern
frontier. Entering Texas he took command of the
Republican army at San Antonio; but suffering a
disastrous defeat, he escaped to Louisiana. He
busied himself in that quarter during the next three
years or more with the organization and promotion
of divers revolutionary enterprises ostensibly in
the Mexican interest. About the middle of 1816, he
professed a change of heart, abandoned the independence cause, and in December of that year embarked for Spain, where royal forgiveness and honorable employment awaited his return.
The full story of Toledo’s activities on this side of
the Atlantic has never been told. A little has been
written about his relations with Secretary of State
Monroe, and a little more about his connection with
some of the border incidents; but apart from these
very brief accounts there is nothing in the published
records to mark his goings and comings, nor to indicate the objects he pursued. His Florida intrigues
1
This article is an outgrowth of an extended project undertaken by the writer for the Florida State Historical Society.
The material upon which it is based consists in part of photostatic reproductions of documents provided by this Society, and
in part of like material loaned by the Manuscript Division of
the Library of Congress. The Research Board of the University
of California has generously given the project financial support.
To all these agencies the writer acknowledges his indebtedness.
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illustrate the point. In two instances only has his
name been even vaguely associated with the State.
It has been said that he gave Monroe, in 1811, secret
information regarding
the designs of Great Britain
2
on the Floridas; and it has been asserted, without
proof or detail, that he was the author, with General
Mina, of the plots
which culminated in the seizure of
3
Amelia Island. In the first instance Toledo seems
to have had little information to give and no purpose
to subserve except perhaps to gain the good will of
Monroe; but in the second, investigation shows, he
was in effect the promoter of a vastly complicated
intrigue which involved the destiny not only of
Florida but of Louisiana, and, indeed, of America
as a whole. To be understood this intrigue must be
viewed against the background of Toledo’s whole career.
The refugee’s conduct in the United States justifies mistrust of all his professions of attachment to
the independence cause. He was born in Cuba, but
despite that fact was more Spanish than American.
His father, an officer in the Spanish navy, and his
4
mother both were born in Spain. He himself was
educated in the Peninsula, and on growing to manhood followed his father’s example by enlisting in
his country’s navy, in which he rose to the rank of
lieutenant. In the war resulting from the Napo2

I. J. Cox, “Monroe and the Early Mexican Revolutionary
Agents” in Annual Report of the American Historical Association,
1911, I, 203.
3
Vincente Pazos, The Exposition, Remonstrance and Protest of
Don Vincente Pazos, Commissioner on behalf of the Republican.
Agents established on Amelia Island, in Florida, under the authority and in behalf of the Independent States of South America.
...Presented to the Executive of the United States on the ninth
of February, 1818. Translated from the Spanish. Philadelphia,
1818.
4
Carlos M. Trelles, “Un Precursor de la Independencia de Cuba:
Don Jose Alvarez de Toledo,” in Discursos Leidos en la Recepcion Publica del Sr. Carlos M. Trelles y Govin (Havana, 1926),
49, 77, 84.
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leonic usurpation in 1808, he saw service against the
invaders. But his navel career was soon interrupted.
In 1810, when the national assembly known as
the Cortes of Cadiz was convened on the island of
Leon, he was chosen to represent Santo Domingo
in that body. Within a year, the course of his life
changed again. He vacated his seat in the Cortes
and embarked clandestinely for the United States.
It is important to know, if possible, why Toledo
took this step. By his own account, which he set
forth in a manifesto published at Philadelphia
shortly after his arrival in the United States, he
fled to escape the wrath of the very Cortes of which
he was a member. He had written, it appears, certain letters to his constituents in the island of Santo
Domingo counseling them to take measures for their
own safety and well-being and warning them against
trusting too much to the protection of the mother
country dominated as it was by Great Britain. These
letters by some untoward circumstance were intercepted after they reached the island. They were
sent back to Spain and eventually were transmitted
to the Cortes accompanied by charges which had
been formulated against the writer. An order for
his detention and trial followed. It was because he
was fearful of the outcome that Toledo sought safety
in a country where, as he expressed it, he would be
5
beyond the reach of despotic power. But it is doubtful whether this account reveals the whole truth.
Is it possible that Toledo left Spain with a definite
mission? The distrust of England, to which he gave
6
expression in his speeches in the Cortes as well as in
the correspondence with his constituents in Santo
5
“Manifesto o Satisfaccion Pundonorosa, a Todos los Espanoles
Europeos, y a Todos los Pueblos de la America, por un Disputado
de las Cortes Reunidas en Cadiz,” in Trelles Discursos, Appendix
II.6
Wellesley to Castlereagh, July 6, 1819 (Private and Confidential), Foreign Office, 72/225.
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Domingo, and the friendly associations which he established with Bonapartist agents and sympathizers
upon his arrival in the United States, suggest the
possibility of a French connection. Indeed the Spanish minister, Onis, who watched with attention the
refugee’s movements, very soon came to the conclusion, at least so he asserted, that the flight from
Spain was a premeditated step in an intrigue of the
usurper Bonaparte whose object was to deliver the
unsuspecting Spanish Americans. into the arms of
France. But after further observation the Spanish
minister came to the very different conclusionagain it must be pointed out that this is what Onis
asserted-that Toledo was the instrument of a plot
instigated by the American deputies in the Cortes
with a view to encouraging the colonies to strike for
independence. With this purpose, Onis professed
to believe, France and the United States were in ac7
tive accord.
Of these two views, the latter seems the more
plausible ; for it is not wholly inconsistent with Toledo’s own explanation nor with his actions during
the first few months of his stay in the United States.
Moreover this view derives a measure of support
from a certain document which Toledo had in his
possession at the time of his ‘repentance’in 1816.
This was a commission reputedly signed by the Mexican deputies in the Cortes on July 14, 1811, which
empowered Toledo, then about to embark for America, to raise an army and establish a revolutionary
government in the Internal Provinces of northern
Mexico. But the authenticity of this paper cannot
be vouched for. The original was torn to bits by
7
Onis to Bardaxi y Arara, September 25, and December 28, 1811,
Archivo Historico Nacional, Estado, Legajo, 5554; same to same,
January 20, 1812, A. H. N., Est., Leg. 5638.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol12/iss4/3

4

Lockey: The Florida Intrigues of Jose Alvarez de Toledo

149
8

Toledo, and the known copies do not, of course, contain the signatures and other data from a study of
which the genuineness of the document might be determined. Nor has it been possible, by evidence of
any other sort to establish the fact that such a commission was ever issued. Until that is done, Toledo’s connection with the Mexican deputies must remain in the realm of doubt.
It may be that none of the explanations accords
with the facts of the case. Toledo may have been
neither a mere refugee, nor a Bonapartist emissary,
nor a representative of the American deputies in the
Cortes. He may have been at the beginning what he
was at the end: a secret agent of Spain. If that was
his role, the way he played it does honor alike to his
loyalty and to his skill; but it is difficult to believe
that his character was so stable or his actions so consistent. He seems on the contrary to have had an
eye to the main chance. He served the master, it appears, that promised the greatest reward.
Why he chose to establish himself in Philadelphia,
where Onis also had his abode, is difficult to explain ;
for life was made miserable for him there, he
claimed, by persecution at the hands of that official.
In the course of a few weeks, however, the unhappy
exile found a friend. A correspondence which he
opened with Secretary of State Monroe resulted in
his being invited to come to Washington, at Mon9
roe’s expense, for an interview. What passed between the two men when they met late in December,
8
Juan Mariano Picornell and Father Sedella were able to join
the torn pieces of the commission together and make a copy which
Sedella sent to Onis under date of July 9, 1816. Cf. Onis to
Cevallos, August 11, 1816, A. H. N., Est., Leg. 5554. Another
copy was intercepted by Royalist forces in Mexico in 1815. cf.
Trelles, Discursos, 153.
9
Communication was carried on for the most part through A.
J. Dallas as an intermediary. See Dallas to Monroe, November
25 December 4, and December 25, 1811, State Dept., Miscellaneous.
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1811, must be inferred in part from scraps of correspondence and in part from the subsequent course
of events. Monroe became convinced, it appears,
that Toledo was moved by a desire to defeat England’s designs on the Spanish Islands and the Floridas, with reference to which he professed to have
secret information ; and that he aspired, at the same
time, to play a part in advancing the general cause
of Spanish American independence. Of greater interest perhaps to Monroe was the visitor’s apparent willingness to serve the United States in the impending contest for territory on the southern frontier; and an agreement of some sort on that head
10
seems to have been reached.
What the agreement was, can only be determined
by viewing it in the light of certain contemporary
events. Some two weeks before Toledo appeared in
Washington, the Mexican agent, Jose Bernardo Gutierrez de Lara, who had been sent to the United
States in search of aid for his country’s faltering
revolution, called at the White House to present
his case directly to President Madison. The President received him with cordiality and expressed sympathy for his cause, but felt obliged to say that since
the United States was at peace with Spain, it could
not take sides in the contest. It would be feasible
however, the President suggested, to send troops to
take possession of Texas as a part of the Louisiana
purchase ; and he intimated that these troops once
they were established on the Rio Grande, could render valuable assistance to the revolutionists. Re11
jecting this suggestion as inacceptable, Gutierrez
sought in further discussions, mostly with Monroe,
10

Onis to Pezuela, October 7, 1812, A. H. N., Est., Leg. 5554.
Under date of January 7, 1812, Toledo wrote Monroe in veiled
terms about setting out on his mission. State Dept., Misc.
11
The name was generally shortened, contemporaneously, to Bernardo, rather than to Gutierrez, or to Lara.
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some other basis of cooperation. An understanding, the exact nature of which is a matter of conjecture, seems to have been reached at about the time
Toledo was invited to come to Washington. The invasion, it appears, was to be effected, not by United
States troops flying the American flag, but by a
heterogeneous expeditionary force composed of Mexican refugees and of American and other adventurers under the Mexican flag.
The arrangement with Gutierrez was doubtless a
subject of discussion between Monroe and Toledo;
and it may have been understood between them that
Toledo was to command the expeditionary force.
It does not follow, however, that Gutierrez was a
party to any such understanding, though his presence on the border seems to have been required under the plan agreed upon. Both Gutierrez and Toledo left Washington early in January, 1812, and
both, it appears, were to set out soon afterward for
the proposed destination. Toledo returned to Philadelphia where he received on the order of John Graham, chief clerk of the State Department, the sum of
seven hundred dollars, presumably to meet the ex13
penses of the journey.
For some reason, however,
he delayed his departure for nearly a full year.
Gutierrez on the other hand embarked within a few
weeks for New Orleans. Upon his arrival there he
presented himself to Governor Claiborne, to whom
he had a letter of introduction from John Graham.
Claiborne in turn introduced him to William Shaler,
special agent of the United States to Mexico. After
a number of conferences with Claiborne, the Mexican
agent and the American agent took passage up
12
“Diary of Jose Bernardo Gutierrez de Lara” in The American
Historical Review, XXXIV. 71-77.
13
Dallas to Graham, January 4, 1812, State Dept., Misc. Toledo
also received divers sums from William Shaler in Louisiana. See
Shaler to Monroe, May 16, 1813, State Dept., Spec. Agts.

Published by STARS, 1933

7

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 12 [1933], No. 4, Art. 3

152
stream for Natchitoches on the Red River at no great
14
distance from the frontier. During the next three
or four months, the two busied themselves-Gutierrez openly and Shaler secretly-with the organization of the expeditionary force. In August, 1812,
the motley assemblage styling itself the “Republican
Army of the North” advanced into Texas under the
joint command of Gutierrez de Lara and Augustus
W. Magee, who resigned from the United States
army to join the expedition. Shaler was to follow in
15
the event of success.
Why Toledo lingered in Philadelphia while these
things were going on, is a question. The Cuban historian Trelles believes that Toledo’s immediate purpose was to embark for Havana to begin a revolutionary movement in the Spanish islands, and that
it was only when the plans for this undertaking
16
proved impractical that he looked, toward Mexico.
This opinion is based in part at least on the fact that
Monroe gave Toledo a letter-dated early in January, 1812-to William Shaler, who had gone to Havana in 1810 and was supposed still to be there. But
Shaler had written Monroe, under date of November
13, 1811, that he expected soon to depart for New
Orleans. That information he repeated in subsequent letters, and on December 11, in point of fact,
he sailed for New Orleans. Monroe knew at the time
of writing the letter of introduction that Shaler had
quit, or was soon to quit, Havana; and he must have
known very shortly after that he had arrived at his
14
“Diary of Jose Bernardo Gutierrez de Lara” in The American
Historical Review, XXXIV, 286-294 ; Claiborne to Shaler, April
7, 1812, State Dept., Spec. Agts.
15
Shaler to Monroe, May 2, May 7, June 12, June 23, August 18,
August 25, 1812, State Dept., Spec. Agents.
16
Discursos, 23, 27.
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17

destination in Louisiana. If, therefore, the letter
has any significance, it points to New Orleans as
Toledo’s immediate objective and to Texas, and not
to Cuba, as the scene of his revoltionary activities.
However that may be, Toledo did not turn his face
toward the west until December, 1812. He then set
out in the company of half a dozen officers, all of
whom like himself looked to the achievement of some
ambition amid the turbulent scenes then being enacted on Mexican soil. At Pittsburg, one of the
number, Colonel Nathaniel Cogswell, abandoned the
party. He had been closely associated with Toledo
for some months past, and before setting out had
begun to entertain suspicions of Toledo’s integrity.
He had now come into possession of information that
seemed to him to convert suspicion into certainty.
He felt it to be his duty, therefore, to warn the leaders of the republican army in Texas, which he was
able to do by despatching a letter by mail ahead of
l8
the party.

I now pledge you my honor as a gentleman, and as an officer;
and I call God to witness the truth of my assertion, that the
object of Mr. Toledo is to play the same game with you as
Miranda 19 did in Caraccas. It has been fully ascertained that the
people of Old Spain finding that it would be difficult or impossible
to prevent the colonies from aimingat independence, have made
arrangements to counter revolutionize, assume the garb of Patriots, and to have all the appearance of being persecuted for
their Patriotism, in order to obtain the confidence of the Patriots,
17
Shaler to Monroe, November 13, November 25, December 6,
December 8, December 27, 1811, State Dept., Spec. Agts. The
letter of November 25, an endorsement shows, was received at the
State Department on December 17. (The writer is indebted to
Mr. Hunter Miller, Historical Adviser of the State Department.,
for this information.) An earlier letter of Shaler’s required only
twelve days to reach Washington. It is not unlikely, therefore
that Monroe had received Shaler’s letter of December 8, by the
end
of that month.
18
Cogswell to Gutierrez and Magee, December 29, 1812, [Extract] State Dept., Spec. Agts. See also in this connection Shaler
to Gutierrez, May 28, 1813, and Shaler to Monroe, June 12, 1813,
State
Dept., Spec. Agts.
10
Miranda had recently surrendered to the Royalist forces in
Venezuela. The belief was common that he had played the part
of traitor. That view is no longer held.

Published by STARS, 1933

9

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 12 [1933], No. 4, Art. 3

154
and to be entrusted by them in important situations, so that when
a favorable opportunity occurs to sacrifice the Patriots and their
cause as General Miranda has done. Such a man is Mr. Toledo.
I pledge you my life on the issue, for I know it to be a fact. To
my certain knowledge Mr. Toledo is in close correspondence with
his relation the Marquis of Villa Franca a member of the Spanish
Cortes-with the Duke of Infantado, a member of the regency; 20
and with others, the most inveterate foes of the Patriotic cause.
. . . The object is to place himself at the head of the expedition,
of which yourself and Magee are now the chiefs. He would then
get rid of you and Magee as soon as possible, when he would
manage everything in his own way; and as far forth as lay in
his power to the utter ruin and subversion of the Patriotic cause.
Rely upon what I now tell you. Toledo has not a single particle
of Patriotism, his only object is by a great shew of disinterestedness, and affected Patriotism to deceive you, and get himself at
the head.

As intended, this letter went in advance of the
party to Natchitoches, from which place it was for21
warded to its destination. Meanwhile Toledo and
his retinue proceeded at a slower rate down the Ohio
and the Mississippi to Natchez. There Toledo found
himself the object of further mistrust. At Rapides
he was humiliated by arrest and brief detention on
the ground that he was a French agent. Rumor
preceded him and when he arrived at Natchitoches,
in April, 1813, the mistrust had become general. But
William Shaler was not among the doubters. Receiving his information from high sources he was little.
influenced by mere rumor or by unsubstantiated
charges. He did everything in his power, therefore,
to make known what he regarded as the correct view
of Toledo’s mission. He was so successful in allay20

The Marquis of Villafranca was in effect a member of the
Cortes, and the Duke of Infantado had been a member of the
Regency since January 21, 1812. - Lafuente, Historia General de
Espana, XVII, 269, 466. Toledo may have been related to the
Duke of Infantado (Pedro Alceantara de Toledo) as well as to the
Marquis of Villafranca. Cf, Trelles, Discursos, 44-45.
21
The letter was sent to the Postmaster at Natchitoches, who
consulted Shaler before sending the packet on by express. There
is a possibility that Shaler may have acquainted himself with the
contents of the letter before it was allowed to proceed. See Jno.
Johnston [Postmaster at Pittsburgl to the Postmaster at Natchitoches, December 29, 1813, and Shaler to Monroe, February 26,
1813, State Dept., Spec. Agts.
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ing the suspicion that Toledo ventured to send his
subordinates on to join the army and to go himself
as far as Nacogdoches, in eastern Texas, to await
22
developments.
But the conditions were not yet ripe for Toledo’s
assumption of power. Uninterrupted successes had
been the portion of the army since it entered Texas
eight or nine months before. Though Magee had
23
died in the midst of the campaign, Gutierrez was
able to carry on as the sole commander with good results. He had just won, with the aid of the American volunteers, a brilliant victory over the Royalist
army, capturing hundreds of prisoners including the
Governor of the Province, taking a great quantity of
arms and military stores, and laying the capital,
24
San Antonio, open to occupation by his troops.
Now master of the Province, he formed a provisional
government with himself at its head. His position
at the moment seemed secure. In the circumstances
25
Toledo saw no hope of achieving his aim. Accordingly he retraced his steps to Natchitoches,
where he continued, with Shaler’s aid, to plot against
the leadership of Gutierrez in the Texan regime.
Several months were to elapse before Gutierrez
was at last forced to yield. His downfall may be
attributed in great part to William Shaler. It was
Shaler who encouraged the spirit of discontent
among the Americans in the army. It was Shaler
who laid the ugly charges against Toledo by facing
Cogswell-when he appeared on the scene-and
branding him as “a base and treacherous colum22
Shaler to Monroe, April 18, 1813, State Dept., Spec. Agts.;
Morphy to the Viceroy of New Spain, May 8 and 25, 1813, Archivo
General, Mexico, Guerra, Notas Diplomaticas, III.
23
Shaler to Monroe, February 26, 1813, State Dept., Spec. Agts.
24
Shaler to Monroe, May 7, 1813, State Dept., Spec. Agts.;
Morphy to the Viceroy of New Spain, May 21, 1813, A. G. M.,
Guerra, N. D., III.
25
Toledo to Monroe, May 6, 1813, State Dept., Spec. Agts.
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niator.” It was Shaler who gave countenance at
every turn to Toledo’s doubtful cause. But Gutierrez himself must bear his share of the blame. He
was his own worst enemy. He weakly permitted a
number of the officers captured at San Antonio to
he butchered, to the great disgust of the Americans
and of many of the Mexicans as well ; he did nothing
to strengthen his position or to pursue his advantage in the neighboring territory; and he failed miserably in his efforts to organize and administer a
government
suited to the peculiar needs of the sit26
uation. In short, it was incompetence at San Antonio no less than intrigue at Natchitoches that
opened the way for Toledo.
The denouement was astonishingly sudden. On
July 24, 1813, Toledo set out from the Trinity in
Eastern Texas for San Antonio, where he arrived
early in August. He immediately assumed command, Gutierrez retiring to Louisiana. In the meantime, Colonel Arredondo with a Royalist force advanced from Laredo and took up a position on the
Medina river a few miles from San Antonio. Thereupon Toledo mustered his army, freshly recruited
and superior in numbers as well as in warlike equipment, and marched out to meet the foe. On August
18, the two forces clashed and after a sharp fight
Toledo’
s band fled from the field in the greatest dis27
order.
From that day the proud Republican Army
of the North ceased to exist. A few of its more fortunate members, among whom was Toledo, succeeded
in reaching safety across the Louisiana border. So
complete was the victory that the independence
movement in Texas was left in a state of paralysis
26
Shaler to Monroe, May 7, 1813, H. A. Bullard to Shaler, June
27, 1813, Jas. B. Wilkinson to Shaler, June 27, 1813, State Dept., Spec. Agts.
27
Shaler to Monroe September 5 and September 19 1813 State
Dept., Spec. Agts.; Onis to Labrador, October 8, 1813, A. H. N.,
Est., Leg. 5639.
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from which it was not to recover for years to come.
The hopelessness of further effort was apparent at
once to Shaler, and he soon returned to Washington.
Toledo retired for a while into Tennessee.
Two weeks before the battle, Cogswell died of a
fever at Rapides. If he had lived he would have
had the dismal satisfaction of pointing to the disaster as the perfect vindication of his charges; but
there the matter would have ended. Nothing could
cause the tide of opinion to turn against Toledo. He
was strangely immune from attacks on his personal
character. The men who were with him on the Medina and who fled with him across the border found
no reason to suspect him of double-dealing; Shaler
continued to regard him as trustworthy; the Mexican
insurgents with whom he was associated afterward
in divers enterprises believed him to be devoted to
their cause; and with few exceptions the chroniclers
of the events in which he played a part have to this
29
But
day represented him as a man of good faith.
poor Cogswell may have been right and the supporters of Toledo wrong.
It might have made a difference if those who retained their faith in Toledo’s integrity despite every
suspicious circumstance could have seen a letter that
Onis wrote in cipher to his Government under date
of October 7, 1812, more than two months before
Toledo set out for the western frontier.

The ex-deputy of the Cortes Toledo came the day before yesterday to tell me that since his arrival here he has been in direct
communication with the Government [of the United States] with
a view to fomenting revolution in our Americas, particularly in
Mexico: that he acknowledges his inconstancy, that he remembers that Spanish blood flows in his veins, that he anxiously
desires his pardon and readmittance to the bosom of the fatherland; but that although he recognizes the generosity of our Gov28
Arredondo to the Junta de Guerra, April 10, 1817, A. G. M.,
Historia,
Tomo 152.
29
Alaman, Historia de Mejico, III, 488 ; Zamacois, Historia de
Mejico, IX, 216; Bancroft, North Mexican States and Texas, II,
31; Yoakum, History of Texas, I, 173-175; Trelles, op. cit.
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ernment and confidently expects to be treated by it with the
benevolence with which a father treats a wayward son, he would
not be satisfied with the pardon unless, before obtaining it, he
gave proofs of a repentance consecrated by some essential service.
He assured me that he believed himself to be in a position to
render such a service by virtue of the fact that this Government
has agreed that he is to go and take command of a body of two
thousand men that have been raised in the Province of New Orleans, to which body another of Mexican insurgents in Texas will
be united: that his plan is to concert with one of the chiefs of
the Internal Provinces an arrangement by which he would surrender unconditionally the troops under his command along with
the twelve thousand rifles and three thousand sabers that have
been sent by this Government to the insurgents: and he adds that
he is certain of success if he is provided
with the funds requisite
for carrying the plan into effect. 30
The sum required, five thousand pesos, 31 presented
a difficulty. Onis alleged that he did not have
such a sum at his command ; besides he was unwilling to pay before the event. He held out the hope,
however, that the reward might be even greater if
the promise were kept. To encourage Toledo he
offered to advance a modest sum to meet the expenses of travel, and he offered further to dispatch a
special messenger to enlist the cooperation of the
Commandant of the Internal Provinces. B u t T o ledo maintained that money in hand was essential
to the success of his plan. Since he could not obtain
it, and since he had given up his original idea of
leading an army against Spain, there seemed to be
no reason for his making the journey to the frontier.
He gave Onis to understand, however, that he would
consider the matter further and return to report his
final decision. But he did not return, and Onis coneluded that his only object was to obtain money under the false pretense of loyalty to Spain. 32
Reverting to the subject in a subsequent despatch,
Onis declared that this opinion had been confirmed.
Time had passed and still Toledo had not returned.
30

Onis to Pezuela, A. H. N., Est., Leg. 5554.
So stated by Onis in a later letter [to Ferdinand VII] dated
September 19, 1819. A. H. N., Est., Leg. 5554.
32
Onis to Pezuela, October 7, 1812, A. H. N., Est., Leg. 5554.
31
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Instead he had slipped away to Washington to confer with the Secretary of State, after which he had
set out, with flattering promises from that official,
for the western front. 33 Onis cautioned the authorities to be on the lookout. If the traitor attempted
to enter the dominions of Spain he could be recognized, said Onis, by the following description: “Toledo is of medium height, light complexion, good
figure, well proportioned, and about 36 years of
a g e . ’’ But Onis gave the warning in a perfunctory
manner; for the revolutionists lacked, in his opinion,
the leadership and the resources necessary to achieve
success. 34 When the news of the disaster on the
Medina reached Washington he showed no surprise.
He forwarded to his Government an account of the
event which appeared currently in the newspapers.
In his accompanying letter he betrayed no sign of
exultation over the outcome nor of interest in the
part Toledo played in the affair. 35
After the Texas fiasco, Toledo ceased to be, it
seems, in any sense an agent of the State Department. On the surface he was a rebel against Spain,
and Onis so characterized him in all his official correspondence, with the Government at Madrid as well
as with that at Washington. Whether this was his
true character or not, Toledo played the part successfully for two or three years longer. For a while
he was on the Sabine inciting the Mexicans to shed
their blood in the sacred cause of liberty. 36 In 1814,
he went to New Orleans, where he was arrested on a
charge of violating the Neutrality Act; but he escaped prosecution because no testimony was brought
against him.37
He took part, it is said, in the famous
33
34
35
36
37

Onis to Labrador, March 4, 1813, A. H. N., Est., Leg. 5554.
Onis to Labrador, August 18, 1813, A. H. N., Est., Leg. 5639.
Onis to Labrador, October 8, 1813, A. H. N., Est., Leg. 5639.
Trelles, Discursos, 131.
American State Papers: Foreign Relations, IV, 431.
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battle of New Orleans, on the American side. 38 During the next year and a half he was engaged, the evidence abundantly shows, 39 in all manner of enterprises intended, ostensibly at least, to promote the
interests of the revolutionists. Yet none of his efforts resulted in the slightest benefit to the cause;
indeed, in many cases, they seemed to produce the
opposite effect. 40 Was this because Toledo willed it
to be so?
Many of his dealings with the insurgents suggest
a positive answer to this question; unfortunately,
however, the limitations of space do not permit this
phase of the subject to be inquired into. It must
suffice to direct attention for a moment to the parallel case of a certain Juan Mariano Picornell, who
served Toledo as aide-de-camp. Picornell, a Spaniard who had played an obscure part in the revolution in Venezuela, went to Philadelphia in 1812, and
was one of the small group of men who accompanied
Toledo to the West. Cogswell knew him and thought
him even less to be depended upon than Toledo. 4l
It was Picornell’s function, it appears, to go ahead
and prepare the way. 42 We was in Texas weeks before his chief, and if there were any secret negotiations with the Royalist commander, Picornell doubtless conducted them. Like Toledo he escaped to Louisiana and there continued to play the insurgent
38

Trelles, Discursos, 33.
Onis to the Viceroy of New Spain, October 26, 1815, and
numerous other documents in A. G. M., Guerra, N. D., III, bear
on this subject.
40
This is an example: “Por una carta qe acabo de recibir del
Vice-Consul Ynterino de S. M. de Nueva Orleans Don Diego
Morphy, aparece qe la Goleta Petit Milan, qe Toledo habia enviado a Boquilla de Piedra, con cantidad de armas, municiones,
proclamas, y otros efectos, ha perecido con todo su cargamento.”
— Onis to Cevallos, March 30, 1816, A. H. N., Est., Leg. 5641.
41
Cogswell to Gutierrez and Magee, December 29, 1812, [Extract]
State Dept., Spec. Agts.
42
Toledo lo manda siempre por delante.-Morphy to the Viceroy
of New Spain, June 11, 1813, A. G. M., Guerra, N. D., III.
39
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role; but he threw off the disguise long before his
43
chief. As early as February, 1814, he gave up all
pretense of insurgency, and being pardoned by his
Royal master, was thereafter more successful in
frustrating the plans of the revolutionists than he
44
had ever been in promoting them.
The defection of Picornell, to be sure, proves
nothing ; but it heightens the mistrust with which
Toledo’s acts must be viewed. The striking parallelism between the two cases is suggestive more of
collusion than of coincidence. It is difficult to escape the conjecture, despite all Onis’s declarations to
the contrary, that both set out from Phialdelphia to
render some “essential service” to the crown of
Spain; and if this be fact, the pardon in both cases
was a mere device intended, no doubt, to serve the
double purpose of disguising the transaction and of
inducing other leaders to follow the example set.
Toledo was less fortunate than Picornell in obtaining the prompt indulgence of the crown. It is vague45
ly intimated that he too applied for pardon in 1814,
upon the return of Ferdinand to the throne; but if
the boon was not then granted, it must have been because Toledo had not yet fully rendered the service
to which he was committed as the duty of a Spanish
agent, or as a sign of the true penitence of a recreant
Spanish subject. Be that as it may, his continuance
on the frontier put him in possession of a vast
amount of information regarding the connivance of
American authorities in the efforts of the revolutionists to dismember the Spanish empire in the New
46
World ; and that information presumably would
43
Trelles, Discursos, 139; Apodaca to O’Donoju, March 30, 1814,
Archivo
General de Indias, Papeles de Cuba, Leg. 1856.
44
Onis to the Viceroy of New Spain, January 8, 1816, and other
letters
in A. G. M., Guerra, N. D., III.
45
See an undated report of Onis in A. H. N., Est., Leg. 5554,
(L.46C. p. 1126).
Onis to Cevallos, August 11, 1816, A. H. N., Est., Leg. 5554.
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be of great value in consolidating European opinion
against so unholy a combination. When, therefore,
Toledo quit New Orleans, about
the middle of July,
47
1816, after a final repentance, he did not go, crestfallen and ashamed, to assume the difficult task of
rehabilitating a traitor’s name: he went buoyantly
to lay the fruits of his labors at his master’s feet.
But he was not yet to embark, for Spain, nor was
he immediately to lay aside his Patriot garb. Returning late in the summer of 1816 to his former
haunts in the eastern part of the United States, he
professed still to be attached to the Mexican cause.
He renewed old associations and made constant companions of the numerous revolutionary agents who
now congregated in the principal cities of the Atlantic seaboard. With Onis, his relations perforce
were secret. Months passed and no one seemed to
suspect him. Meanwhile, he was busy with his intrigues. In New York he attempted, with false designs, to encourage Joseph Bonaparte to assert his
48
claims to the Mexican throne.
In Baltimore
he
49
spied on Xavier Mina and succeeded, it appears,
in interesting him in a scheme to launch an attack on
Florida. Then, accompanied by Pedro Gual, a representative of the revolutionary government of New
Granada, he went to Washington to lay the plan before the State Department. Due to the fortuitous
47

Onis to Cevallos, July 7, 1816. A. H. N., Est., Leg. 5641, and
the letter cited in Note 46. Toledo’s formal application for pardon was dated at Philadelphia, December 12, 1816. The document
is in A. N. N., Est., Leg. 5554. Trelles basing his narrative on
the Memorias of Garcia de Leon Pizarro, gives the date of this
communication
as December 12, 1815. This is manifestly an error.
48
Onis to Cevallos, August 30, 1816, A. H. N., Est., Leg. 5554.
For the development of this intrigue see, Onis to Cevallos, September 16, 1816, A. H. N., Est., Leg. 5641, and same to same in
Leg. 5554 under dates of October 20, 1816, November 16, 1816,
and
November 23, 1816.
49
Letter cited above under date of August 30, 1816. The discussion between Toledo and Mina on the subject of Florida is
inferred.
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circumstance of Monroe’s absence from the city, the
visitors conferred with John Graham who communicated at once the substance of the conversation in
writing to his chief. Thus a record of the transaction was preserved.

Genl Toledo and Mr. Gual were with me yesterday [wrote
Graham] to say that they had wished to have seen you, to assure
you that the Patriots of “Mexico & So America would do no act in
-the Ports of the U States contrary to Law-that they knew what
the Law was and would take care not to violate it that they
also wished to apprise you that the want of a convenient Port
on the Gulf of Mexico might perhaps induce them to take possession of Pensacola, but if they did so it would be with no view
ultimately to keep it as it ought to belong to the U States. They
seemed anxious to know how such an act on their part would
be viewed by this govt. On that point I could of course say
nothing: but I intimated to them as my individual opinion that
it was an act on which they ought maturely to deliberate as it
might be seized on by the British Ministry as a reason for taking
measures against them-and perhaps by bringing them so immediately in our neighbourhood lead to consequences which could
not be foreseen and might not be agreeable either to us or to
them-Should you & the President think it would be injurious to
the U States that the Revolutionary Party should take Pensacola
-I am of the opinion that an indirect intimation might be given
in time to prevent the attempt tho’perhaps in this I am mistaken- 50

Here seem to be the beginnings of the Amelia
51
Island affairs. Vicente Pazos, whose Exposition
was written shortly after the event, is the sole authority for the assertion that Toledo and Mina originated, in the summer of 1816, the plot which culminated nearly a year later in the seizure of the island
by Sir Gregor MacGregor. Graham’s letter supports
that view; but it does not show what was undoubtedly true, that Mina was to be the instrument for carrying the plan into execution. The silence of all the
contemporary documents on this point is strange,
though it is not strange that Graham should have
been left in ignorance of the fact. The conspirators,
as a matter of discretion, no doubt refrained from
50
Graham to Monroe, September 12, 1816, N. Y. Pub. Lib., Monroe51 Papers.
Pazos was connected with the Amelia Island establishment
at the time of its suppression in December, 1817. See footnote 2.
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disclosing their intention to violate the neutrality
laws. Moreover, Mina was already under a heavy
weight of suspicion. He had arrived a short while
before from England with the nucleus of his Mexican expedition,-a ship, supplies, and a few officers
-and deserters from his ranks had spread reports
of his plans on all sides. Onis complained, but the
52
government did not interfere. A week or so before
the conference in Washington two vessels of the expedition, one the ship acquired in England and the
other a schooner hired in the United States, put to
sea. On board were arms and ammunition and some
two hundred men, most of whom were recruited in
the ports of Baltimore and New York. A few weeks
later Mina himself sailed on board a brig, also obtained in the United States, and early in October
joined the first contingent at the rendezvous in the
53
harbor of Port au Prince.
From this port, Pazos asserts, the invasion of
Florida was to be carried into effect. Two simultaneous attacks were to be launched, one under Mina
and the other under Toledo. But, says Pazos, the
damage sustained by some of the vessels in a storm
and the defection of Toledo caused Mina to abandon
the scheme and sail away to join Aury at Galveston
Island, The concomitant circumstances-the arrival of the expedition at Port au Prince, the damage
to the vessels, the delay, and finally the departure
for Galveston Island-are amply corroborated by
Robinson’s narrative and by documentary evidence
52
Onis to Monroe, July 22, August 28, August 29, and September 11. 1816 (the last with affidavits enclosed), State Dept.,
Notes from the Spanish Legation; Monroe to Onis, August 16
and September 12, 1816, State Dept., Foreign Legations, Notes.
53
Wiiliam Davis Robinson. Memoirs of the Mexican Revolution.
Including a Narrative of the Expedition of General Xavier Mina
(Philadelphia, 1820), 57.
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54

found elsewhere. The principal facts, however, do
not meet with a like substantiation. Robinson’s account contains no reference to the supposed descent
upon Florida, nor to Toledo’s connection with the expedition in any capacity. Official communications
and other available documents, published and unpublished, are equally silent, unless a single letter of
Mina’s be admitted as an exception. Writing from
Port au Prince to General Montilla, Mina declared
that “ T- remained in Philadelphia because of the
55
withdrawal of Gabriel and others.“ That “T--”
was for Toledo is not, in the light of all the circumstances, a rash surmise.
If it. be assumed then, as the evidence seems to
warrant, that the Pazos account is substantially correct, it is interesting to speculate on the motives of
the two protagonists of the enterprise. Mina undoubtedly acted in good faith. Intrigue was foreign
to his character. A devotee of liberty, he had been
forced to flee his native Spain soon after Ferdinand
returned to the throne. He made his way to England
whence he embarked, with British assistance, on his
expedition for the liberation of Mexico. The Florida
invasion, whether it first occurred to him before his
arrival in the United States or after, seems to have
been incidental to his main purpose. Disappointment at Port au Prince may have caused him to banish the idea from his mind altogether. If so, he soon
had occasion to give the subject fresh consideration;
for while he was busy at Galveston Island with his
preparations for the invasion of Mexico, he received
overtures from certain persons in New Orleans who
54
Robinson, op. cit.; Simon Bolivar to Maxwell Hyslop, September 26, and October 4, 1816, in Cartas del Libertador (Lecuna
Ed.), I, 252-253.
55
September 17, 1816, in O’Leary, Memorias, XI, 348. This letter
was obviously misdated, for Mina did not arrive at Port au Prince
until early in October. Cf. Robinson, Memoirs, 57, and the letters of Bolivar cited in note 54.
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desired to have him lead an attack on Pensacola and
who offered to furnish men and arms for the purpose. Accordingly he went to New Orleans, early
in 1817, to investigate the proposal; but finding it. to
be, in his opinion, a mere mercantile speculation
from which no advantage would accrue to his Mexican undertaking, he rejected it. For, “As a soldier
and a patriot,” says Robinson, “he disliked to war
for mercenary considerations, and he was most de56
cidedly hostile to all predatory projects.“
The matter may not have been as simple as Robinson makes it appear. It is not improbable that the
New Orleans overture was of a piece with the Toledo
intrigue. Spanish agents-Picornell and Father
Sedella, perhaps-in collusion with Onis, may have
been attempting to do what Toledo had failed to do;
that is for reasons known to themselves, they may
have been attempting to divert the Mina expedition
from the coast of Mexico. Yet Mina, despite his unwillingness to lead the attack against Pensacola, saw
57
the advantage of an insurgent base in Florida, and
he may still have cherished the hope of obtaining
one on that coast. In April, 1817, his expedition, escorted by Aury’s privateers, landed at the Mexican
58
coast town of Soto la Marinai.
His purpose was to
hold that port, or some other convenient place on the
Mexican coast, as a point of contact with the outside
world. In any logical development of the plan, Aury’s function would have been to acquire an additional port in Florida, and to keep the communication open between the two places. There is no proof
56
Memoirs of the Mexican Revolution, 76. Charles Morris, Commanding the U. S. Frigate Congress, reported the rumored attack
by Mina in a letter to the Secretary of the Navy under date of
March 14, 1817. See extract of his letter in State Dept., Despatches from Consuls. The British Consul at New Orleans gave
similar
information under date of March 4, 1817.-F. O. 115/27.
57
Robinson, Memoirs of the Mexican Revolution, 261.
58
The correspondence relating to the expedition is found in
A. G. M.. Historia, Tomo 152.
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that such an understanding existed. But in view of
all the circumstances-Mina’s known interest in the
subject, the relations between Mina and Aury, and
the raising of the Mexican flag by Aury at Amelia
Island a few short months later-the conjecture is
not wholly, without justification. If the plan was
never fully realized, it was perhaps due more to
Mina’s failure in Mexico than to Aury’s mismanagement of affairs at Amelia Island.
Toledo’s motives are more difficult to divine. In
part, his
purpose was no doubt to frustrate Mina’s
59
plans. The expedition, it seemed obvious, could not
be prevented from sailing, given the weakness of the
neutrality laws and the indifferent attitude of the
60
government at Washington. If it landed in Mexico
it might do infinite harm, for Mina’s prestige and
his capacity as. a leader might readily turn the balance in favor of the revolutionists. If it could be
diverted to Florida, which was doomed to be lost in
any case, it would spend its strength in vain. Moreover, the resulting delay would give Toledo or some
other agent time to compass its destruction by boring
61
from within.
Yet destruction of the expedition was not the only
object sought. The actual seizure of a Florida port
was no less desired. That being the case Pensacola
could hardly have been the objective, for its defenses
rendered it impregnable against a force such as that
at Mina’s command. Shortly before Mina sailed
from Baltimore a rumor, probably inspired by the
conspirators themselves, that Pensacola was to be
59

Onis to Cevallos, August. 30, 1816, A. H. N., Est., Leg. 5554.
Onis to Cevallos, September 11, 1816, A. H. N., Est., Leg. 5641.
Onis to Cevallos. December 7, 1816, A. H. N., Est., Leg. 5641.
Robinson gives a circumstantial account (Memoirs, 69-71) of a
mutiny at Galveston Island led by a certain Correa, who was an
agent of Onis. The plot was discovered and Onis’s part in it
exposed. In writing to his Government (December 7, 1816, A.
H. N., Est., Leg. 5641) Onis mentioned the charge, but did not
deny it.
60
61
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seized by the Patriots was circulated in the public
press. During the fall of 1816 and spring of 1817,
62
the rumor gained fresh currency from time to time.
Meanwhile the eyes of the conspirators must have
been on defenseless Amelia Island in the other corner of the State. At any rate there, months later,
the blow was to fall.
But why should Toledo, a Spanish agent, instigate
an attack upon his own sovereign’s territory? The
answer to this question has already been intimated:
to precipitate a war in which England or other European power, or powers, would be brought to the
side of Spain. Shortly before the Toledo intrigue
came to a head, Onis wrote his government that the
United States had taken measures for strengthening
the defenses of West Florida and Louisiana in anticipation of a possible war with Spain. The authorities at Washington desired the war, said Onis, but
in order to make it popular they were attempting to
maneuver Spain into the position of the aggressor.
Beginning with the insult to the Spanish minister in
63
1809, there had been a long series of acts offensive
to Spain. The Floridas had been invaded, Mobile
and Pensacola had been taken, the insurgents had
been permitted to operate on our soil, our agents had
fomented revolution throughout the Spanish colonies, and privateers had been allowed to fit out in
our ports to cruise against Spanish commerce. Back
of all these acts was the deliberate intention of pro62

Niles' Weekly Register, XI, 64 (September 21, 1816) ; Ibid., XI,
106 (October 12, 1816) ; Ibid., XII, 46 (March 15, 1817). See
also Captain Charles Morris to the Secretary of the Navy (Extracts), March 14, and April 17, 1817, State Dept., Despatches
from
Consuls.
63
From 1808 to 1814 there were two governments in Spain: one
at Madrid under French auspices, and another at Cadiz under a
regency in the name of the captive Ferdinand. Onis came to the
United States in 1809 as the representative of the government
at Cadiz; but he was not received until 1815. The government
at Madrid was not recognized.
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voking Spain to declare war. Dread of complications alone prevented the United States itself from
taking the initiative. “The only thing that restrains,
or can restrain, this government,” declared Onis,
“is the fear that England, France
or Russia might
64
make common cause with us. . . .“
The United States undoubtedly was restrained by
the fear of European intervention; but it was restrained even more by the confident expectation of
65
attaining its end by peaceful means. Spain on the
other hand had everything to lose unless a general
war could be provoked. To the achievement of that
aim its agents in the United States seem to have been
directing all their efforts. Just before Toledo returned to Philadelphia from the West, Onis proposed in a letter to his Government a measure which,
if it had been carried into effect, would have resulted
inevitably in the desired conflict. His idea was to
cede the Floridas-if the United States declined to
accept them in exchange for Louisiana-to England,
or better to France. War of course would result,
and Louisiana would be recovered and ceded to one
of the allies. Spain would perhaps reserve the island
and city of New Orleans for itself. Thus, a powerful and ambitious nation, whose subversive principles were a menace to the monarchical form of government, would be confined to limits within which
66
it could do no harm.
After he had had an opportunity to confer with
Toledo, Onis wrote again, adding fresh details. The
cession of the Floridas to England, it now appeared,
was to be in the nature of a bribe to hold that power
in check. Spain itself would take Louisiana. Toledo
64
65

Onis to Cevallos, May 30, 1816, A. H. N., Est., Leg. 5660.
Adams to Monroe, March 30, 1816, Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, III, 1437; Erving to Monroe (Private and Confidential),
September 22, 1816, Monroe Papers, N. Y. Pub. Lib.
66
Onis to Cevallos, August 11, 1816, A. H. N., Est., Leg. 5554.
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would see to that. His knowledge of the conditions
in the territory and his influential connections there
admirably fitted him for rallying the disaffected
population to the standard of Spain. The conquest
made and a friendly power installed, assistance
would always be at hand in time of need. The western States of the American Union, cut off from the
navigation of the Mississippi and the other rivers
that flow into the Gulf, would eventually be compelled to reunite with Spain. The tranquillity of
Mexico and of all the colonies to the south would
67
be assured.
The Mesa, a section of the foreign ministry to
which these letters were submitted for recommendation, endorsed on the first a brief report which in
part reads as follows:
Onis’s idea of ceding the Floridas to England in order to remove the Anglo-Americans from our vicinity would be like chasing
a fox out of the sheepfold and throwing in a wolf instead. England has been, is, and will forever be the natural enemy of Spain
and of every power that has coasts or colonies, or that may have
ships or foreign trade. 68

The second letter bears a similar indorsement. A
man of Onis’s talent should have perceived, declares
the report, that Toledo was openly mocking him. The
talk of conquering Louisiana was ridiculous. It was
equally absurd to count upon any assistance from the
inhabitants of that territory; for they were the ones
who had been most active in giving support to the
insurgent cause.
That was a strange way to show
69
love for Spain.
These were the views, it must be observed, of under officials who may not have known that the seemingly fantastic proposals had a practical end to
serve; that is, that they were intended to trap the
United States into assuming the offensive to ward
67
68
69

Onis to Cevallos, August 30, 1816, A. H. N., Est., Leg. 5554.
Onis to Cevallos, August 11, 1816, A. H. N., Est., Leg. 5554.
Onis to Cevallos, August 30, 1816, A. H. N., Est., Leg. 5554.
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off imminent attack. If this were the purpose, it
was essential that knowledge of the plot should be
permitted to leak out. The conspirators themselves, it may be presumed, attended to that detail.
In the midst of the affair, Colonel Thomas S. Jesup
commanding the United States forces in Louisiana
wrote Monroe :
I have positive information that an attack is contemplated by
the Spaniards on this City [New Orleans], during the present
season-The Spanish Minister De Onis, has a number of Agents
in this Country, who are, I understand, endeavouring to ascertain what individuals are favourable to Spain, and are using other
means, for the purpose of organizing a revolution. The last mail
brought a letter from the Minister on the subject. I am not at
liberty to say how I obtained my information, but you may rely
on the correctness of the fact. 70

Some two weeks later Jesup wrote:
A secret negotiation is going on between the courts of Madrid
and London for the purpose of transferring to Great Britain
the Floridas and the Island of Cuba, for which, it is understood,
she is to assist in reducing to subjection the revolted colonies of
Spain. This information is derived from a person in the confidence of the Spanish Consul and who has seen the papers. 71

Aroused by this information, Jesup was disposed
to precipitate the conflict; for he was a strong believer in the offensive defense. It was his intention,
at the first hostile gesture on the part of Spain, to
occupy Florida ; and with the assistance of the naval
commander on the station, he proposed to carry the
war deeper into the enemy country by seizing Cuba,
the key not only to the islands and the Spanish Main,
72
but to all Western America.
But there were cooler
heads. “If the offensive defense alluded to by this
officer,” said President Madison, “should be carried into execution it would be perhaps the boldest
project ever assumed by no higher authority.” Yet
70
71
72

August 21, 1816, State Dept., Misc.
Letter to Monroe. September 3, 1816. State Dept.. Misc.
Jesup to Monroe, August 21, l816, State Dept.; Misc.; Jesup
to Claiborne, August 24, 1816, Claiborne Papers, Library of Congress.
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the matter was not, as Madison saw it, of trifling
importance. He thought the intriguing at New Orleans was probable and the meditated attack possible, though he would have said impossible if there
had been less of folly in Spanish councils or less
likelihood of foreign support for Spanish undertakings. In any case, if mischief were brewing our
minister at Madried would discover it. In the meantime it would be sufficient to pay attention to such
precautionary measures as prudence
and the means
73
at our disposal might warrant.
If aggression on the part of the United States had
been the outcome, the conspirators might have had
their wish. The Old World might have combined
against the New. The conditions on the whole favored such an alignment. The reactionary governments of the continent were strongly inclined to lend
assistance to Spain. Feeling toward the United
States was generally hostile. “The Royalists everywhere,” said J. Q. Adams, who viewed the situation
from the vantage point of London, “detest and despise us as Republicans. . . . Emperors, kings, princes, priests, all the privileged orders, all the establishments, all the votaries of legitimacy eye us with
74
the most rancorous hatred.“ An obstacle, to be
sure, stood in the way of the desired combination.
That obstacle was England. This power had steadfastly refused to intervene by force of arms to restore the rebellious colonies to their former subjection. Moreover, its policy was to maintain friendly
75
relations with the United States. Yet popular
feeling in England as elsewhere was hostile toward
the upstart republic, and the feeling was heartily
73
Madison to Monroe, September 22, 1816, N. Y. Pub. Lib., Monroe Papers.
74
J. Q. Adams to John Adams, August 1, 1816, J. Q. Adams,
Writings, VI, 61.
75
C. K. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, .408, 437.
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reciprocated on this side of the Atlantic. In the
circumstances a trifling incident might have brought
the two powers to blows.
Influences tending to produce the incident were
constantly at work. During 1815 rumors of the cession of Florida to Great Britain
were repeatedly
76
circulated in the British press. Whatever the purpose, the effect was to exacerbate feeling between
the two nations. The rumors were so persistent and
so circumstantial in character that Adams went early
in February, 1816, under instructions from his Government, to make inquiries at the Foreign Office.
He was assured that the reports were without foundation. “Military positions,” said Lord Castlereagh, “may have been taken by us during the war
of places which you had previously taken from
Spain, but we never intended to keep them. Do you
only observe the same moderation. If we shall find
you hereafter pursuing a system of encroachment
upon your neighbors, what 77
we might do defensively
is another consideration.“
But British trouble
makers continued to busy themselves with Florida.
The machinations of Colonel Nicolls more than anything else, perhaps, set in motion the train of events
that resulted in the execution of Arbuthnot and Ambrister. War on that occasion would have been the
outcome, Lord Castlereagh afterward declared to
78
Rush, “if the ministry had but held up a finger.“
If Jesup’s offensive defense had been undertaken,
and especially if it had been directed against Cuba,
the finger of the British ministry might have been
76
On January 1, 1816, Onis reported to Cevallos that the news
from England regarding the supposed cession had caused general
consternation, that General Jackson, then in Washington, was
holding frequent conferences with the President, and that nobody
doubted but that Jackson was going to be given command of an
army
to take possession of the Floridas.-A. H. N., Est., Leg. 5641.
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Adams to Monroe, February 8, 1816, Writings, V, 502.
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raised in 1816. But the conspirators must have
known that such a move would be made only in response to a warlike gesture on the part of Spain.
The Florida intrigue gave promise of throwing the
onus of aggression on the United States. By the
secret Act of January 15, 1811, the President had
been authorized to take possession of Florida in the
event of an attempt on the part of any foreign government to occupy it. The Act was still in force, and
the policy of the Administration was still to carry it:
79
into effect, if occasion demanded. In the light of’
these facts, the visit of Toledo and Gual to Washington for the purpose, as they alleged, of apprising
the government of their intention to seize a Florida
port takes on fresh significance. “They seemed
anxious to know.” said Graham. “how such an act
on their part would be viewed by this govt. . ..”
Graham’s guarded reply that the contemplated seizure might lead to British intervention or to other
consequences disagreeable to the United States must
have been encouraging to Toledo, if not to Gual. But
more encouraging must have been Monroe’s reply to
Graham directing that "Mr. Toledo” be told that in
the event the revolutionists took possession of Pensacola, the law of 1811 might be considered appli80
cable to the case. How ingenuous was Monroe in all.
his dealings with Toledo!
With Spanish territory invaded by the United
States, the rest would be simple. England would
immediately undertake to repel the invasion by force
of arms. That this was the view of the agents in the
United States can scarcely be doubted. The principals in Madrid entertained a like view, though they
may have been unacquainted with the full details
of the Florida plot. But principals and agents both
79
80
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were reckoning without their host. A private letter
of Castlereagh’s to Wellesley, British ambassador
at Madrid, written shortly after the events of the
summer and fall of 1816, throws a flood of light on
the subject.
I think Spain cannot be too cautious in avoiding by every
possible means a quarrel with that power [the United States] ;
and don’t let her falsely calculate upon embarking Great Britain
in her cause by such an expedient. I make this remark the
rather, because I observed in the note presented in October by
Fernan Nunez, but which was prepared at Madrid, an assumption that we had pledged ourselves to resist by War any Encroachment on the part of America in the Dominions of Spain. 81

The assumption, Castlereagh went on to say, was
based erroneously on his conversation with Adamsthe one alluded to above-the substance of which
had by some means become known at Madrid. In
concluding this interesting communication, Castlereagh said :
I have stated thus much, in order that you may correct any
Misconceptions you find to prevail, & which do mischief in proportion as by holding out false hopes of involving other States
in their Quarrels, the Spanish Govt. postpones, from day to day,
adopting a rational Course of Policy for itself.

This counsel went unheeded. Spain obstinately
pursued its course. It preferred to believe that the
great powers of Europe, England included, could
be brought to support its cause. It was loath to
abandon the position of innocent victim of atrocious
wrong. It did nothing to adjust its differences with
the United States. On the contrary it permitted
conditions to arise which at last resulted in the
courted violation of its territory. Late in 1817, the
military and naval forces of the United States took
possession of Amelia Island to suppress the establishment formed there some months before by Sir
Gregor MacGregor. If Spain, itself, had destroyed
the establishment, which it could have done with
82
slight effort, the United States would have been
81
82

January 10, 1817, F. 0. 72/196.
See “MacGregor’s Invasion of Florida, 1817” by T. Frederick
Davis, in the Florida Historical Society Quarterly, July, 1928.
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deprived of its pretext for invading Florida on that
occasion. Likewise Jackson’s invasion a few months
later to punish the Seminole Indians would have
been forestalled if the Spanish authorities had not
complacently allowed certain British subjects to embolden the Indians by imbuing them with the false
belief that England would come to their support. On
neither of these occasions did the desired European
interposition result; yet it must be remembered that
it was in connection with Jackson’s invasion that
England and the United States were brought to the
verge of war.
These invasions were in some sense the culmination of Toledo’s Florida intrigues. When they occurred, however, their author already had embarked
for Spain. Before his departure, the break with his
insurgent past was made public by what appears to
have been a carefully prearranged plan. Toledo,
it is known, contemplated sending
an agent to Ha83
vana in the summer of 1816. The ostensible object was to revolutionize Cuba; but it is perfectly
well established that Toledo was not now, if he had
ever been, a devotee of the cause. If, therefore, the
agent went on the mission, and the evidence shows
that he did, his object must have been different from
the one assigned. Undoubtedly it had to do with
Toledo’s exit from the insurgent stage. In November a packet of letters, prepared, it appears, with design, was dispatched by the Captain General of Cuba
84
to the Spanish minister in Washington. On the
way, also by design, no doubt, these letters were allowed to fall into the hands of insurgent agents by
whom they were delivered to the editor of a news83
The Captain General of Cuba to the Minister of War, June
12,841816, Trelles, Discursos, 97.
Onis to Cevallos, November 23, December 4, 1816, A. H. N.,
Est., Leg. 5554; same to same, December 7, 1816. A. H. N., Est.,
Leg. 5641; Onis to Captain General of Cuba, December 8, 1816,
A. G. I., Papeles de Cuba, Leg. 1898.
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paper in Baltimore.
All except two communications
in cipher, which could not be read, were published.
Among these published letters was one from Toledo’s father to Onis inclosing a bill of exchange for
two thousand pesos to be delivered to the son in the
event he fulfilled his promise; and another from the
father to the son exhorting him to follow the path
of honor and give proof of his true devotion to the
king.
To his own government, Onis characterized the interception and publication of the letters as an outrageous act, unheard of among civilized nations. He
would have complained to the authorities at Washington and brought suit against the publisher, but
was advised by eminent counsel that nothing could
be accomplished by such a course. In his opinion the
worst of it was the probability that all the correspondence of the legation, both going and coming,
86
was tampered with. The reader of the despatches,
indeed, is led to suspect that Onis always acted on
this belief; that is, that he committed to the ordinary
correspondence only what he was willing to have,
or designed to have, any foreign government read,
and that he carried on really secret communication
by safer means. His complaints about the interception of the letters must therefore be taken with reserve, and likewise the further complaint that the
publication of the letters spoiled a plan that he had
projected with Toledo for bringing to an end forever the interference of the Americans in the Mexican revolt. The truth of the matter probably is that
Toledo’s ‘defection’and departure were in exact
accordance with a carefully laid plan.
Toledo’s Florida intrigues did not end with his
abandonment of American shores. He spent several
85

The Baltimore Patriot and Evening Advertizer. The letters
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published in the issues of December 2 and December 4, 1816.
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years at the Spanish court, in evident favor with the
Cabinet to whom he gave advice on American af87
fairs. In the summer of 1819, while Spain was
searching for some means of evading ratification of
the treaty of cession signed at Washington on February 22 of that year, Toledo was sent to London
to arrange, if possible, the sale of the province to
Great Britain. The plan was for England to advance six million dollars by way of a loan to enable
Spain to discharge the American claims and thus
get rid of the treaty lately concluded at Washington.
The Floridas would then be made over to Great
88
Britain as security for the repayment of the loan.
On being informed of the mission by Wellesley, Castlereagh conceived that it might have consisted merely of a report put in circulation to feel the ground, or
that it might have been connected with some “low
intrigue” of the Camarilla at Madrid, or of persons
interested in the recent grants of crown lands in the
Floridas. By taking this view, which he made known
to the Spanish ambassador, Castlereagh forestalled
89
Thus the last Florida intrigue
all negotiation.
with which Toledo was connected came to a fruitless
end.
87
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